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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

JACK B. PARSON CONSTRUCTION
CO., a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

:
:
:
:

THE STATE OF UTAH, by and
through the DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,

:
:

Defendant-Respondent.

:
No. 17693

THE STATE OF UTAH, by and
through the DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
Third-Party PlaintiffRe spondent,
vs.
THE AETNA CASUALTY 6c SURETY
CO. ,
Third-Party DefendantAppellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S STATEMENTS OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE,
OF THE RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL,
AND OF THE DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
t
Appellants do not reply to the preliminary statements
in respondent's brief, other than to refer the Court to appellants' original brief and to note that by requesting that Thorn
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be

overruled,

respondent

has

framed

the

issue

in

the case:

Whether to overrule Thorn by affirming the district court or to
follow Thorn by reversing the district court.
REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
There are two fundamental defects in the Statement of
Facts in UDOT's brief.

First, it does not agree with the facts

found by the trial court.

Although Parson disputes the trial

court's ultimate decision, the dispute is only over the lower
court's conclusions of law, not the findings of fact.
Second,

UDOT's

with the record.

Statement

of

Facts

does

not

comport

It consists of facts taken out of context,

factual allegations

contrary

and legal arguments.

to or unsupported

by the record

In addition, it ignores several salient

facts establishing its liability.
What

follows

is

a

more

specific

response

to

the

various allegations in respondent's Statement of Facts, taking
them roughly in the order in which they are presented.
UDOT's first assertion, contained in the introductory
portion of its Statement of Facts, is that the provision in the
Standard Specifications (Section 104.02) regarding supplemental
agreements is not a changed conditions clause.
a

legal

argument.

The

issue

is

not

what

This is clearly
to

call

Section

L04.02, but whether Parson was entitled to relief thereunder.
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UDOT's statement on p. 3 of its brief (unsupported by any citation to the record) that no change of a type contemplated by
Section 104.02 was recognized by UDOT is blatantly false.

UDOT

specifically and expressly admitted that Parson was entitled to
a supplemental agreement (Ex. 26-P).
UDOT's statement at the bottom of page 3 that Parson
could have used sources other than pit 1 or 2 is false.

UDOT

admits at p. 17 of its brief that there were no other feasible
alternatives.
Contrary to UDOT's present allegations, UDOT has previously conceded that the procedures by which pits 1 and 2 were
determined by UDOT to be acceptable were not the procedures
required by UDOT's own rules

(Tr. 960-963, 990-999).

Also,

prior consideration of these pits was made pursuant to specifications

much

less

strict

than

those

confronting

Parson.

Compare the specification table on Sheets 31 and 32 of the
Special Provisions (Ex. 3-P) with the predecessor specifications on p. 136 of the 1970 edition of the Standard Specifications (Ex. 1-P).

The previous contractors using these pits

were also operating under the earlier, looser specifications.
The last of these contractors had real problems meeting even
the old materials specifications, and the UDOT project engineer
recommended

that

these

1014-1016; Ex. 86-P).

prospects

not

be

used

again

(Tr.

At trial, a UDOT employee admitted that

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the

contractors

preceding

Parson

had

removed

all

of

the

material described on Sheet No. 2B from these sources.

(Tr.

861-862).
The next portion

of

respondent's

Statement

of

Facts

purports to discuss Parson's pre-bid activities and bid.

UDOT

does not dispute that Parson had less than three weeks within
which to investigate prior to its bid.

Yet the State alleges

that Parson should have conducted an investigation that could
not possibly have been performed in this limited period of time.
Notwithstanding UDOT's legal argument on p.4, UDOT did
expressly warrant all of the positive representations
contract

documents#

thereby

accepting

the risk

of

in the

inaccurate

representations (Standard Specification Section 102.05).

It is

these affirmative statements, as confirmed by on-site inspection, that lulled Parson into reliance.
The representation

in Special Provision Sheet No. 44

that, "Both Prospect No. 1 and Prospect No. 2 have been previously used for untreated base course and bituminous
course

on

leading.

previous
This

1-70

reference

successful prior

projects,"
was

is

obviously

among

intended

use of these pits, not that

been found no longer usable.

the

surface

most

to

show

misthe

these pits had

There was nothing to put Parson

or any other reasonable contractor on notice of a problem about
which previous contractors should be consulted.
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UDOT attempts to make much of the fact that Parson had
not worked in the area.

However, the bidding was open to all

contractors, not just the local ones.

Unfortunately, the in-

formation presented by the State was extremely misleading to
all except those with personal knowledge of the actual conditions.
The allegations that Wilson was told that blend sand
might have to be added should be contrasted with the earlier
statement in the contract documents that additives need not be
used.

More significantly, even the addition of blend sand

could not turn the prospect No. 2 product into specification
material.

(Tr. 263-285).

-

Although Wilson and McDonald may have known generally
of the type of documents sometimes found in UDOT files, it is
UDOT's Spensko that had the most specific knowledge of that
information

(Tr. 1020-1022).

Yet Spensko made representations

in the contract documents contrary to that information.

Based

on their prior experience, Wilson and McDonald had no reason to
expect that UDOT files would contradict UDOT'S representations
as to site conditions.

It was UDOT'S employee, Spensko, who

admitted his "oversight" in failing to communicate accurate
information to bidders (Tr. 996-1000).
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Even
(Standard

the

contract's

Specification

reference

Section

Special Provisions) is misleading.
to

contractor-generated

documents

to

102.05,

documents
as

on

amended

by

file
the

That section does not refer
or

to

general

geological

data, both of which UDOT claims Parson should have looked for.
Moreover, none of the geological

evidence submitted

at trial

challenged the testimony of plaintiff's trial experts as to the
variable make-up of the formation and the abrupt, unforeseeable
changes in materials encountered by Parson (Tr. 766-770).
UDOT next contends

that Parson did

not

rely on

the

information in Sheet No. 2B or Special Provision No. 44 in preparing its bid.

The record

one responsible

for preparing

trary, stating he reviewed
detail and used
(Tr. 158-161).

is to the contrary.
the bid, testified

this information,

Wilson, the
to the con-

". . . in great

it to compile the heart of my entire bid."
UDOT claims that such reliance was

and incompetent."

"misplaced

If information in the plans and specifica-

tions is known to be so unreliable, it should not be presented
at all.

In pointing out that the contractor with previous ex-

perience using these prospects made the high bid, UDOT merely
highlights the severe handicaps for the other bidders created
by the state's misinformation.
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and organ-

mac-:!! i ic: i] : makes
rather

ob-

jncractor,

iw

selects equipment and operating procedures based upon what it
is told in the plans, specifications and other contract documents.

UDOT did designate pits 1 and 2 as acceptable for use

on the project.

It also admitted at trial (Tr. 1012-1016) and

in its brief that these were the only materials sources reasonably available.

Its suggestion at page 10 of its brief that

another source could have been used cannot be taken seriously.
UDOT's description of the problem Parson

encountered

regarding aggregate size is one of the few parts of its brief
that

is

quite

accurate.

material present
crush

the

even

material

after

that

Because

of

waste

was

passed

the

the

softness

rejected/
number

16

of

the

attempts
screen

to

into

material retained by the number 50 screen resulted in a flour
like

product

screen.

incapable

of

being

retained

by

a

number

200

Hence/ the excess "minus 200 , s" (Ex. 37-P, 38-P).
UDOT's allegations regarding the Parson stockpiles are

nonsense.
that

Specification stockpiles obviously require a source

produces

specification

materials.

Although

Mecham

may

have found these materials deficient/ as did Parson, he had no
solution

either.

Under

the contract, Mecham was required

to

determine the "exact location and manner of stockpile" (Special
Provision Sheet No. 4 4 ) .
intentionally

built

Wilson never testified

borderline

stockpiles, either

that Parson
on this or
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of the piles tested were not specified

(Tr. 1322-1329).

All

the test shows is that 63 percent of the material was larger
than minus 200, not that any of this material would have withstood

the

further

crushing

required

to produce

specification

material.
r

various

Parson

was

basically

modifications

product.

None

did.

would

experimenting
improve

Wilson

the

testified

techniques simply were not workable.

to

see

whether

quality

that

any

of

the

additional

(Tr. 457-459).

UDOT does not dispute that as a result of the foregoing

difficulties

it

agreement with Parson

decided

to

enter

into

a

supplemental

(now characterized as a "concession" or

"compromise") (Ex. 26-P).

However, UDOT acted unreasonably by

attempting to limit the scope of that agreement to the removal
of 15

feet of overburden,

although

their

own core

drillings

showed that 35 feet had to be removed. (Tr. 368-370).
UDOT now denies that there was 35 feet of overburden
by

disingenuously

implying

that

drilled in the wrong locations.

their

own

test

holes

were

Two of the holes were drilled

only 200 feet east of the face of the pit, rather than the 400
feet claimed in UDOT's brief

(Tr. 1065).

Parson assumes that

UDOT drilled where it did because Parson's removal of materials
vas progressing eastward from the face.
the

locations

to

be

representative

at

UDOT must have assumed
the

time,

since

selected them.
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suf-

uDOT's

Tit- . idding
btained

the

pi • 1 i'ul<l be

132- -r,
cviu--,-i-

at

con-

Prospect

Tr. 1587 one of the contractors testified that he planned

to

begin operations in pit no. 1, not that he intended to get all
of his materials from there.

More importantly/ Parson offered

to move to pit no. 1, even though it felt that pit no. 1 did
not contain sufficient material.

(Ex. 29-P).

The reason set forth by UDOT for Spensko's refusal to
test the BLM property to the north of Prospect 2 is unacceptable.

Spensko assumed

that the material seen from a

surface

inspection was representative of the material behind the face.
Of course this is the same mistaken assumption he made regarding Prospect 2.

Also, at the time he was making this assump-

tion, Spensko was aware of overburden 28 feet deep on the BLM
property (Tr. 1080-1081).

On page 15 of its brief, UDOT states

that a subsequent contractor used the BLM property to complete
the work.

That allegation is totally improper since it raises

facts entirely outside of the record on appeal.
other

UDOT

leading.
despite

representations,

this

one

UDOT relaxed specifications
a

contract

What the record

price

nearly

is

also

Moreover, like
totally

mis-

for the new contractor,

twice

as high

as Parson's.

shows is that the BLM property was not made

available to Parson until too late, and that UDOT subsequently
corrected

its

representations

concerning

site

conditions
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to

show the softness and variation of the material likely to be
encountered. (Tr. 381-383; Ex 183-P).
The letter cited by UDOT as making it "clear" that
Parson could have
written
estimate

used

permission"
when

future

the

says

BLM property

no

BLM

such

approval

thing.
might

"prior
All
be

to

it

formal

does

obtained

is

(Ex.

30-P) . The only "guarantee" Parson asked for regarding the BLM
property was the same one it requested regarding prospect No.
2,

that UDOT stand behind

its

representations.

UDOT con-

sistently refused to do so.
x

The final section of UDOT's Statement of Fact alleges

Parson responsibility for failing to discover the information
UDOT had scattered throughout its files.

As will be argued

more fully below, where the government makes affirmative misrepresentations rather than merely withholds facts, failure of
the contractor to inspect referenced documents will not allow
the government to avoid
there

were

numerous

liability.

affirmative

As discussed elsewhere,

misrepresentations

or

mis-

leading statements in the contract documents.
This latter part of UDOT's factual presentation is
similar to the earlier parts, factually inconsistent and unsupported by the record.

In some places UDOT alleges that the

withheld information was extremely important and so Parson was
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remiss in not hunting for it.

In other places it alleges that

the information was unimportant and so was not included in the
plans and specifications.
the plans

and specifications

On the other
would

On the one hand UDOT asserts that

have

accurately portrayed

Prospect 2.

it argues that review of the documents on file
revealed

the

problems

countered.

Parson

subsequently

en-

,. v

UDOT responds

to the high

wear

test

results

in

its

files by stating that Prospect 2 had already produced specification

materials

for other

contractors.

Of

course, as

dis-

cussed above, these specifications were easier to meet than the
ones applicable to Parson
Moreover,

these

other

(Special Provision Sheets 31 & 32).

contractors

had

great

difficulty

ob-

taining competent material, leading to the express recommendation that the pit not be used in the future (Tr. 1194-1195; Ex.
81-P; Tr. 861-862).
UDOT's

claim

r

that

crushing" avoids the issue.

soft

material

makes

Whether the material

for

"easy

is hard or

soft, the information provided by the State must be accurate in
order for the contractor to prepare a fair bid and perform the
contract

adequately.

one might expect

From

Sheet

2B and Special Provision

10-15 percent of

the material would be

44
too

soft for specification, but no one would expect virtually all
of the material to fall in that category.
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UDOT finally gets to the heart of the matter when it
admits at p. 17 of its brief that there was "no known alternative" to these material sources.

Spensko1s cited testimony

makes it clear that the reason he ignored the advice of a prior
UDOT project engineer to find another location and the reason
he defined the material in these sources as being of "excellent
quality"

is

1012-1016).

that

there

was

no

other

alternative

(Tr.

UDOT decided to use these sources regardless of

their quality.
UDOT's
defects.

description

of

Spensko's

tests

show

their

They were done only on the face of the pits, on the

apparent assumption that the material behind the face was the
same (notwithstanding UDOT's allegations that Parson was negligent in failing to discover this material was not the same) .
Had Spensko followed the testing pattern required by UDOT's
regulations, he would have discovered that the material was not
the same.

Thus, it was not "realistic" to decide not to do

further testing.

Spensko's rationalizations for this decision

again show that UDOT intended to use these pits regardless of
what the tests showed

(Ex. 92-B, Tr. 1000-1013, 1021-1022).

Spensko's complaint of inadequate time to do further testing
especially rings hollow, in light of the degree of testing and
pre-bid investigation UDOT now claims Parson should have performed in a shorter period of time.
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Interestingly enough, Spensko states that his decision

not to discose the "historical" information in UDOT's files was
because specification changes gave the information questionable
value (Tr. 1028-1029).
UDOT

in

claiming

This is the same information cited by

other

contractors

had

"successfully"

used

Prospect 2 and in claiming that Parson's pre-bid investigation
was negligent.

Much of this

"historical" information

is not

even referenced by the contract documents.
The UDOT employee who performed the L.A. Rattler test
after Parson commenced performance came to the site at the request of the UDOT project engineer who indicated there was a
problem with material breakdown

(Tr. 883-901).

Even with the

margin for error alleged by UDOT, the test result significantly
exceeded

the 40% maximum

UDOT employee

(Tr. 895-902).

The

fact

that

the

"informed" no one of this result hardly excul-

pates UDOT, especially since the test was filed in UDOT files.
In November,

this

same

employee

again

tested

pit

no.

2

at

UDOT's direction, and again received an L.A. Rattler result in
excess of 40% (Tr. 902-908).
results.

This time Spensko was told of the

The record established that numerous variables affect

the outcome of L.A.

Rattler

tests.

However, the

independent

tests Parson had perfomed were consistent with the UDOT tests
taken about the same time, in showing a severe wear problem in
Prospect No. 2 (Tr. 289-304, 600-604; Ex. 35-P).
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Recognizing the "problems" with the designated sources
for this project, UDOT specifically requested aid
Federal Highway Administration

from the

indicating

the materials had

been "incorrectly identified" (Ex. 101-P).

The fact that, at

the time, Taylor did not realize the effect of his admission
against

interest

that

UDOT

"incorrectly

identified"

the

materials in Prospect 2 does not make that admission any less
important.

Since FHWA did realize the effect of that admis-

sion, it indicated UDOT would be responsible for any increased
expense (Ex. 102-P) .

•••-.*•

Finally, UDOT completely mischaracterizes the testimony of its witnesses concerning the geology of the area.

At

several places in Swapp's testimony he notes the possibility of
faulting (Tr. 1475-1476, 1483).

Spensko and Lund could not

tell whether there was faulting or not, although Lund indicated
that the evidence was highly suggestive of faulting (Tr. 1092
et. seg., 1723 et. seq.).

All three men relied largely upon

aerial photographs that, as Waggoner explained, were optically
deceiving (Tr. 812). Swapp had not worked in that area in ten
years and Lund had never visited the job site.
Thus, Waggoner's testimony

(Tr. 767-784) as to the

sudden and unforeseeable change in the character of Prospect 2
stands unrebutted, as does the testimony of Neff (Tr. 899-918)
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on the numerous varieties of materials in Prospect 2 other than
limestone.

UDOT attempts

to shrug

this latter point

off by

claiming that this was a mere withholding of information otherwise discoverable by Parson.
representation.

Instead, it is a positive mis-

UDOT did not merely indicate that Prospect 2

was in a limestone formation or that limestone was among the
materials contained in the prospect.

It stated "this prospect

consists of limestone ledgerock" which was untrue.
-

ARGUMENT

v<

This case is squarely controlled by Thorn Construction
Co., Inc. v. UDOT, 598 P.2d 365 (Utah 1979).

UDOT acknowledges

this fact by urging the court to overrule Thorn.

Under Thorn,

a contractor may recover when, acting reasonably, he is mislead
by incorrect plans and specifications issued as the basis for
bids.

As discussed below, each of these elements is present in

the instant case:
Parson acted

UDOT's statements were materially incorrect;

reasonably; and UDOT's statements were both in-

tended to be relied upon and were relied upon as the basis for
bids.
I.

UDOT Made Numerous False and Misleading Statements.
UDOT

and/or

made

misleading

cluding:

numerous

statements

affirmative
in

the

misrepresentations

contract

documents,

I
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in-

(1) that Prospect 2 was "acceptable in general"
[Standard Specification Subsection 106.02(a)]?

(

(2) that Prospect 2 "consists of limestone ledgerock" (Special Provision Sheet No. 44);
(3) that other contractors had used Prospect 2
(implying

successful

use)

(Special

Provision

Sheet

No. 44; and
(4) that test results

(impliedly performed

in

accordance with UDOT requirements) indicated Prospect
2's suitability (Plan Sheet No. 2B).
Evidence explored above, along with the Findings of
the court, establish

the falsity

of

this

information.

In

particular, the Finding that the material first encountered was
poor and subsequently became worse contradicts almost every one
of these representations (Finding No. 28). There was no representative sampling, as UDOT contends.

Only the

information

reflecting favorably on use of Prospect 2 was provided.

The

decision of the trial court was not based on the accuracy of
UDOT's representations, but on the mistaken view that UDOT was
not bound by its representations (Conclusion No. 6 ) .
In

another

example

of

the

unreliable

information

Parson has received from UDOT throughout the controversy, UDOT
claims on page 22 of its brief that "pit 2 contained suitable
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material but required careful quality control in aggregate production" and that a prior contractor "by contrast was careful
and selective in the material and methods it used and succeeded
where appellant
than UDOT

failed."

Based

representations, that

on personal

knowledge

same contractor

bid

rather

$650,000

higher than Parson on the project at issue (Ex. 6-P).
Clearly, the instant controversy falls squarely within
the scope of Thorn.

If anything, the instant case is an even

stronger case for the contractor.

Thorn involved one general

oral representation; here there are several affirmative representations
relating

in

the

written

to performance

of

contract
the

documents

specifications.

specifically
There

is

no

basis for the State's rather revealing request that Thorn be
"disregarded, if not specifically overruled."
II.

Parson Had No Duty to Discover the
Falsity of UDOT's Representations.

As stated above, Thorn requires the contractor to act
reasonably.

UDOT suggests this imposed upon Parson a duty to

discover, by availing itself of UDOT's files and other information, the falsity of UDOT's representations.

This is not the

law.
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A distinction must be made between cases such as the
instant one, in which the State makes a positive, material misrepresentation, and those cases in which the State merely provides

insufficient

information

without

misrepresenting

a

material fact.
Flippin Materials Co. v. U.S., 312 F.2d 408 (Ct. CI.
1963), relied upon heavily by UDOT, aptly illustrates this distinction.

There, the contractor's claim was based upon the

government's failure to make a representation, and not on a
governmental misrepresentation.

The government prevailed based

on the contractor's failure to inspect government referenced
documents.

Significantly, at page 413, note 7, the court made

it clear that had the claim been for a misrepresentation, such
misrepresentation would not be excused by general warnings to
review or inspect documents.

Tri-County Excavating, Inc. v.

Borough of Kingston, 407 A.2d 462 (Pa. 1979), also relied upon
by UDOT, explicitly distinguishes its facts from cases of misrepresentation ("constructive fraud").
In fact, UDOT does not cite a single case in which the
government made a material misrepresentation;
"silence"

cases.

See, e.g.,

Highland

it cites only

Construction

Co.

v.

Stevenson, 636 P.2d 1034 (Utah 1981), L.A. Young Sons Construction Co. v. County of Tooele, 575 P.2d 1034 (Utah 1978), R. C.
Tollman Construction Co. v. Myton Water Association, 563 P.2d
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780 (Utah 1971),

and J.A. Thompson & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaii, 465

P.2d 148 (Hawaii 1970).

The misrepresentation cases hold that

failure to inspect referenced documents does not make a contractor's reliance upon governmental representations unreasonable.
(Ct.

See, e.g., Stock & Grove, Inc. v. U.S., 493 F.2d
CI.

1974);

Haggart

Construction

Co.

v.

629

State

Highway

a contractor

in Utah

Commission, 427 P.2d 686 (Mont. 1967).
Thorn clearly
has no duty

established

to discover

the

that

falsity of positive assertions,

regardless of the UDOT disclaimer.

Quoting from Hollerbach v.

U.S., 233 U.S. 165, 172 (1914), this court stated:
We think it would be going quite too far to
interpret the general language of the other
paragraphs as requiring independent investigation
of
facts
which
the
specifications
furnished by the government as a basis of the
contract left in no doubt.
...
In its
positive assertion of the nature of this much
of the work it made a representation upon which
the claimants had a right to reply [sic] without an investigation to prove its falsity.
598 P.2d at 368 (Emphasis added).
This rule particularly applies where, as here, the contractor
has insufficient time to conduct such an investigation.

See,

e.g., Haggart, supra, (2 weeks); Canty Asphalt, Inc. v. State,
337 N.Y.S. 2d 415 (N.Y. 1972) (3 weeks).
three

weeks

to

conduct

the

elaborate

Parson had less than
pre-bid

investigation

argued for by UDOT.
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Finally, this distinction is a fair one.

A party who

has made representations for the obvious purpose that they be
believed and relied upon may not avoid liability by arguing
that the deceived party should not have believed and relied
upon them.
argument

Yet this is what UDOT is arguing.

assumes

that

the

representations

Of course this

in question

were

false, or, at any rate, so misleading as to cause an inaccurate
bid.

UDOT is inconsistently asserting on the one hand that the

plans and specifications accurately portrayed Prospect 2, and,
on the other, that reliance upon that portrayal was unreasonable because

contradicted

by

documents

on

file.

In fact,

although the information was inaccurate, the positive, affirmative way in which it was presented in the contract documents
made reliance upon it eminently reasonable.
UDOT
principles

attempts

by

to

blatantly

circumvent

these

mischaracterizing

California, 423 P.2d 584 (Cal. 1967).

well-established
Wunderlich

v.

UDOT states at page 25

of its brief that a contractor cannot recover unless the state
"knowingly"

misrepresents

or

"intentionally"

withholds.

Wunderlich merely holds that the information must be "within
the State's knowledge", not that the State must act knowingly
or intentionally.

Wunderlich does establish that a disclaimer

is effective only when there has been no misrepresentation or
withholding of critical information.
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III.

Sheet No, 2B and the Other Documents Relied
Upon by Parson Were Offered and Received as
Part of the "Basis for the Bid,r7

Thorn allows a contractor to recover where he is "misled by incorrect plans and specifications issued by the public
authorities

as the basis

for bids

. . . ", 598 P.2d

at 368.

Under Thorn, as pointed out in appellant's initial brief, the
trial court's interpretation that Sheet No. 2B was not a document that could be relied upon was a fundamental error of law.
More important than a technical definition of "plans"
or

"specifications"

is whether

the

incorrect

information

intended to be relied upon as the basis for bids.

was

UDOT makes

the technical argument in an attempt to circumvent Thorn contending that the written material is not

included within the

formal "plans and specifications".
The evidence clearly establishes that Sheet No. 2B and
Special Provision No. 44 were relied upon by Parson as a basis
for its bid.

These documents confirmed

the misrepresentation

that the material was acceptable in general.

Sheet 2B was pre-

sented in such a way as to leave no doubt that UDOT intended it
to be relied on as the basis
indistinguishable

from

for bids.

the plans

and

It was bound to and

specifications, and

cluded a technical description of Prospects 1 and 2.

in-

The State

should not have supplied Sheet 2B at all if it was not to be
used in bidding.
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Resolution of this issue is much easier here than in
Thorn, where the court held that a contractor had a right to
rely upon an oral representation.

Certainly an oral represen-

tation is much less likely to be construed as part of the plans
and specifications or the basis for bids than a written document like Sheet No. 2B.
representations

Of course, the most significant mis-

made by UDOT were

contained

in

Special

Pro-

vision No. 44, which UDOT does not dispute was a part of the
plans and specifications.

t

Parson's right to rely is unaffected by whether Subsection
"true"

104.02

(authorizing

changed

conditions

supplemental

clause.

UDOT's

agreements)

is

attempts

pages

at

a

40-45 of its brief to distinguish Fattore v. Metropolitan Sewer
Comission of Milwaukee, 454 F.2d 537 (7th Cir., 1977) and Stock
& Grove, Inc. v. United States, 493 F.2d 629 (Ct. CI. 1974) on
the basis that these cases involved
clauses, are futile.

"true" changed conditions

As Thorn shows, the principles followed

in these cases apply whether or not there is a changed conditions clause.
On

the

other

hand,

UDOT's

cite

to

Jack

B.

Parson

Construction Co. v. State of Utah, 552 P.2d 107 (Utah 1976), as
a

case

case

interpreting

did

not

become

Subsection
relevant

104.02,
simply

is

gratuitous.

because
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Parson

That
was

a

party.
under

There, the only issue was the amount of the computation
a

Subsection

104.02

supplemental

question of what work was covered.

agreement,

not

the

UDOT's proferred interpre-

tation of this provision ignores or defies all of the rules of
construction

discussed

in

conveniently

ignores its own interpretation of this provision

during

Parson's

attempted

agreed

to enter

into a

Parson's

first

performance,

"supplemental

brief.

when

UDOT

UDOT

agreement"

also

expressly

(Ex.

2G-P).

Parson was entitled to a supplemental agreement and, when it
was

no

longer

financially

capable

entitled to suspend performance.

of

going

forward,

it

was

Metropolitan Sewerage Com'n.

v. R.W. Construction, 241 N.W. 2d 371 (Wise. 1976).
CONCLUSION
Parson

is

aware

of

no

jurisdiction,

including

this

one, that follows the rule proposed by UDOT and adopted by the
trial court.

This rule would require contractors to bear all

risk of governmental misrepresentations

in contract documents.

In addition to the inherent unfairness of such a rule, there is
an obvious policy barrier.
the

trial

court

is

If UDOT's position is adopted and

affirmed,

bidders

will

be

required

to

inflate their bids as a hedge against governmental misrepresentations.
bidding

This

frustrates

for public

the

whole

contracts, which

purpose
is

of

to obtain

competitive
the

reasonable contract price.
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lowest

As UDOT points out, the decision of the district court
here and that of this court in Thorn cannot stand together.^
The only way that the Court can ratify the strong principles
behind Thorn is to reverse the decision of the district court.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

ffi

day of August, 1983.

PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
TAYLOR & BRYAN

Jaitiefi A. Boevers
Attorneys for Appellants
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